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authorKarl Berry <karl@freefriends.org>2014-08-26 17:34:04 +0000
committerKarl Berry <karl@freefriends.org>2014-08-26 17:34:04 +0000
commitc2e885c397eeb506ca60c0876acefe8998a75aa9 (patch)
tree82d4c9ac4e09e68ceed87033dd07251d365542e5 /Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle
parent6c4cd2ab2f8d1ebe3a051d700c3005d73eefe04c (diff)
afparticle (26aug14)
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk@35046 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
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+#
+# Makefile for resphilosophica package
+#
+# This file is in public domain
+#
+# $Id: Makefile,v 1.2 2014-08-12 19:44:36 boris Exp $
+#
+
+PACKAGE=afparticle
+
+SAMPLES = afpsample.tex
+
+PDF = $(PACKAGE).pdf ${SAMPLES:%.tex=%.pdf}
+
+all: ${PDF}
+
+
+%.pdf: %.dtx $(PACKAGE).cls
+ pdflatex $<
+ - bibtex $*
+ pdflatex $<
+ - makeindex -s gind.ist -o $*.ind $*.idx
+ - makeindex -s gglo.ist -o $*.gls $*.glo
+ pdflatex $<
+ while ( grep -q '^LaTeX Warning: Label(s) may have changed' $*.log) \
+ do pdflatex $<; done
+
+
+%.cls: %.ins %.dtx
+ pdflatex $<
+
+%.pdf: %.tex $(PACKAGE).cls
+ pdflatex $<
+ - bibtex $*
+ pdflatex $<
+ pdflatex $<
+ while ( grep -q '^LaTeX Warning: Label(s) may have changed' $*.log) \
+ do pdflatex $<; done
+
+
+.PRECIOUS: $(PACKAGE).cfg $(PACKAGE).cls
+
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) *.log *.aux *.spl \
+ *.cfg *.glo *.idx *.toc \
+ *.ilg *.ind *.out *.lof \
+ *.lot *.bbl *.blg *.gls \
+ *.dvi *.ps *.hd *.rpi *.notes
+
+distclean: clean
+ $(RM) $(PDF) $(PACKAGE).cls
+
+#
+# Archive for the distribution. Includes typeset documentation
+#
+archive: all clean
+ cd ..; \
+ tar -czvf $(PACKAGE).tgz --exclude '*~' --exclude '*.tgz' --exclude CVS $(PACKAGE); \
+ cd $(PACKAGE) \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/README b/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/README
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+ Typesetting Articles for Archives of Forensic Psychology
+
+This package provides a class for typesetting articles for the open
+access journal Archives of Forensic Psychology,
+http://www.archivesofforensicpsychology.com.
diff --git a/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/afparticle.pdf b/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/afparticle.pdf
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diff --git a/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/afpsample.bib b/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/afpsample.bib
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+@Article{Haidt07,
+ author = {Jonathan Haidt},
+ title = {The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology},
+ journal = {Science},
+ year = 2007,
+ volume = 316,
+ pages = {998--1002},
+ annote = {People are selfish, yet morally motivated. Morality is
+universal, yet culturally variable. Such apparent contradictions are
+dissolving as research from many disciplines converges on a few shared
+principles, including the importance of moral intuitions, the socially
+functional (rather than truth-seeking) nature of moral thinking, and
+the coevolution of moral minds with cultural practices and
+institutions that create diverse moral communities. I propose a fourth
+principle to guide future research: Morality is about more than harm
+and fairness. More research is needed on the collective and religious
+parts of the moral domain, such as loyalty, authority, and spiritual
+purity.}
+}
+
+@article{DeMarzo05,
+ type={Working Paper Series},
+ title={{Relative Wealth Concerns and Technology Bubbles}},
+ author={Demarzo, Peter M. and Kaniel, Ron and Kremer, Ilan },
+ journal={SSRN eLibrary},
+ year=2005,
+ publisher={SSRN},
+ keywords={Bubble, technology, relative wealth, Joneses, herding, over-investment},
+ location={http://ssrn.com/paper=668137},
+ note={\url{http://ssrn.com/paper=668137}},
+ language={English}
+}
+
+
+@article{Arrow63,
+ jstor_articletype = {primary_article},
+ title = {Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care},
+ author = {Arrow, Kenneth J.},
+ journal = {The American Economic Review},
+ jstor_issuetitle = {},
+ volume = {53},
+ number = {5},
+ jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 1963},
+ pages = {941--973},
+ url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812044},
+ ISSN = {00028282},
+ abstract = {},
+ language = {},
+ year = {1963},
+ publisher = {American Economic Association},
+ copyright = {Copyright ¿ 1963 American Economic Association},
+ }
+
+@Article{CluttonBrock09:Cooperation,
+ author = {Tim Clutton-Brock},
+ title = {Cooperation Between Non-Kin in Animal Societies},
+ journal = {Nature},
+ year = 2009,
+ volume = 462,
+ pages = {51--57},
+ annote = {Explanations of cooperation between non-kin in animal
+ societies often suggest that individuals exchange resources or
+ services and that cooperation is maintained by reciprocity. But do
+ cooperative interactions between unrelated individuals in non-human
+ animals really resemble exchanges or are they a consequence of
+ simpler mechanisms? Firm evidence of reciprocity in animal societies
+ is rare and many examples of cooperation between non-kin probably
+ represent cases of intra-specific mutualism or manipulation.}
+}
+
+
+
+@article{Henrich10:MarketsReligionFairness,
+author = {Henrich, Joseph and Ensminger, Jean and
+ McElreath, Richard and Barr, Abigail and
+ Barrett, Clark and Bolyanatz, Alexander and
+ Cardenas, Juan Camilo and Gurven, Michael and
+ Gwako, Edwins and Henrich, Natalie and
+ Lesorogol, Carolyn and Marlowe, Frank and
+ Tracer, David and Ziker, John},
+title = {Markets, Religion, Community Size,
+ and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment},
+journal = {Science},
+volume = {327},
+number = {5972},
+pages = {1480--1484},
+doi = {10.1126/science.1182238},
+year = {2010},
+abstract = {Large-scale societies in which strangers regularly engage
+in mutually beneficial transactions are puzzling. The evolutionary
+mechanisms associated with kinship and reciprocity, which underpin
+much of primate sociality, do not readily extend to large unrelated
+groups. Theory suggests that the evolution of such societies may have
+required norms and institutions that sustain fairness in ephemeral
+exchanges. If that is true, then engagement in larger-scale
+institutions, such as markets and world religions, should be
+associated with greater fairness, and larger communities should punish
+unfairness more. Using three behavioral experiments administered
+across 15 diverse populations, we show that market integration
+(measured as the percentage of purchased calories) positively covaries
+with fairness while community size positively covaries with
+punishment. Participation in a world religion is associated with
+fairness, although not across all measures. These results suggest that
+modern prosociality is not solely the product of an innate psychology,
+but also reflects norms and institutions that have emerged over the
+course of human history.},
+eprint = {http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/327/5972/1480.pdf}
+}
+
+@article{Hoff10,
+author = {Hoff, Karla},
+title = {Fairness in Modern Society},
+journal = {Science},
+volume = {327},
+number = {5972},
+pages = {1467--1468},
+doi = {10.1126/science.1188537},
+year = {2010},
+eprint = {http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/327/5972/1467.pdf}
+}
+
+
+@article{Woolley10012010,
+author = {Woolley, Anita Williams and Chabris, Christopher F.
+ and Pentland, Alexander and Hashmi, Nada and Malone, Thomas W.},
+title = {Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in the
+ Performance of Human Groups},
+journal = {Science},
+pages = {science.1193147},
+doi = {10.1126/science.1193147},
+year = {2010},
+abstract = {Psychologists have repeatedly shown that a single
+statistical factor--often called "general intelligence"--emerges from
+the correlations among people's performance on a wide variety of
+cognitive tasks. But no one has systematically examined whether a
+similar kind of "collective intelligence" exists for groups of
+people. In two studies with 699 individuals, working in groups of two
+to five, we find converging evidence of a general collective
+intelligence factor that explains a group's performance on a wide
+variety of tasks. This "c factor" is not strongly correlated with the
+average or maximum individual intelligence of group members but is
+correlated with the average social sensitivity of group members, the
+equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking, and the
+proportion of females in the group.},
+}
+
+
+@article{Stapel08042011,
+ author = {Stapel, Diederik A. and Lindenberg, Siegwart},
+ title = {Coping with Chaos: How Disordered Contexts Promote
+ Stereotyping and Discrimination},
+ volume = 332,
+ number = 6026,
+ pages = {251--253},
+ year = 2011,
+ doi = {10.1126/science.1201068},
+ abstract ={Being the victim of discrimination can have serious
+ negative health- and quality-of-life–related
+ consequences. Yet, could being discriminated against depend on such
+ seemingly trivial matters as garbage on the streets? In this study,
+ we show, in two field experiments, that disordered contexts (such as
+ litter or a broken-up sidewalk and an abandoned bicycle) indeed
+ promote stereotyping and discrimination in real-world situations
+ and, in three lab experiments, that it is a heightened need for
+ structure that mediates these effects (number of subjects: between
+ 40 and 70 per experiment). These findings considerably advance our
+ knowledge of the impact of the physical environment on stereotyping
+ and discrimination and have clear policy implications: Diagnose
+ environmental disorder early and intervene immediately.},
+ eprint = {http://www.sciencemag.org/content/332/6026/251.full.pdf},
+ journal = {Science}
+}
+
+@article{Freeman01:Libertarians,
+ title = {Illiberal Libertarians:
+ Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View},
+ author = {Freeman, Samuel},
+ journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs},
+ volume = 30,
+ number = 2,
+ jstor_formatteddate = {Spring, 2001},
+ pages = {105--151},
+ url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557960},
+ ISSN = 00483915,
+ language = {English},
+ year = 2001,
+ publisher = {Blackwell Publishing},
+ copyright = {Copyright ¿ 2001 Princeton University Press},
+}
+
+@Article{Zintzaras10,
+ author = {Zintzaras, Elias and Santos, Mauro and
+ Szathmary, Eors},
+ title = {Selfishness Versus Functional Cooperation in a Stochastic
+ Protocell Model},
+ journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biolology},
+ year = 2010,
+ volume = 267,
+ pages = {605--613},
+ annote = {How to design an evolvable artificial system capable to
+ Increase in complexity? Although Darwin s theory of evolution by
+ natural selection obviously offers a firm foundation little hope of
+ success seems to be expected from the explanatory adequacy of
+ modern evolutionary theory which does a good job at explaining what
+ has already happened but remains practically helpless at predicting
+ what will occur However the study of the major transitions in
+ evolution clearly suggests that Increases in complexity have
+ occurred on those occasions when the conflicting interests between
+ competing individuals were partly subjugated This immediately
+ raises the issue about levels of selection in evolutionary biology
+ and the idea that multi-level selection scenarios are required for
+ complexity to emerge After analyzing the dynamical behaviour of
+ competing replicators within compartments we show here that a
+ proliferation of differentiated catalysts and/or improvement of
+ catalytic efficiency of ribozymes can potentially evolve in
+ properly designed artificial cells where the strong internal
+ competition between the different species of replicators is
+ somewhat prevented (i e by choosing them with equal probability)
+ Experimental evolution in these systems will likely stand as
+ beautiful examples of artificial adaptive systems and will provide
+ new insights to understand possible evolutionary paths to the
+ evolution of metabolic complexity (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd All rights
+ reserved}
+}
+
+@Article{Boza10,
+ author = {Boza, Gergely and Szamado, Szabolcs},
+ title = {Beneficial Laggards: Multilevel Selection,
+ Cooperative Polymorphism and
+ Division of Labour in {T}hreshold {P}ublic {G}ood {G}ames},
+ journal = {BMC Evol. Biol.},
+ year = 2010,
+ volume = 10,
+ pages = {Article~336},
+ annote = {Background: The origin and stability of cooperation is
+ a hot topic in social and behavioural sciences. A complicated
+ conundrum exists as defectors have an advantage over cooperators,
+ whenever cooperation is costly so consequently, not cooperating
+ pays off. In addition, the discovery that humans and some animal
+ populations, such as lions, are polymorphic, where cooperators and
+ defectors stably live together - while defectors are not being
+ punished-, is even more puzzling. Here we offer a novel explanation
+ based on a Threshold Public Good Game (PGG) that includes the
+ interaction of individual and group level selection, where
+ individuals can contribute to multiple collective actions, in our
+ model group hunting and group defense. Results: Our results show
+ that there are polymorphic equilibria in Threshold PGGs; that
+ multi-level selection does not select for the most cooperators per
+ group but selects those close to the optimum number of cooperators
+ (in terms of the Threshold PGG). In particular for medium cost
+ values division of labour evolves within the group with regard to
+ the two types of cooperative actions (hunting
+ vs. defense). Moreover we show evidence that spatial population
+ structure promotes cooperation in multiple PGGs. We also
+ demonstrate that these results apply for a wide range of non-linear
+ benefit function types. Conclusions: We demonstrate that
+ cooperation can be stable in Threshold PGG, even when the
+ proportion of so called free riders is high in the population. A
+ fundamentally new mechanism is proposed how laggards, individuals
+ that have a high tendency to defect during one specific group
+ action can actually contribute to the fitness of the group, by
+ playing part in an optimal resource allocation in Threshold Public
+ Good Games. In general, our results show that acknowledging a
+ multilevel selection process will open up novel explanations for
+ collective actions.}
+}
+
+@Article{Rainey10,
+ author = {Rainey, Paul B. and Kerr, Benjamin},
+ title = {Cheats as First Propagules: A New Hypothesis for the
+ Evolution of Individuality During the Transition from
+ Single Cells to Multicellularity},
+ journal = {Bioessays},
+ year = 2010,
+ volume = 32,
+ pages = {872--880},
+ annote = {The emergence of individuality during the evolutionary
+ transition from single cells to multicellularity poses a range of
+ problems. A key issue is how variation in lower-level individuals
+ generates a corporate (collective) entity with Darwinian
+ characteristics. Of central importance to this process is the
+ evolution of a means of collective reproduction, however, the
+ evolution of a means of collective reproduction is not a trivial
+ issue, requiring careful consideration of mechanistic
+ details. Calling upon observations from experiments, we draw
+ attention to proto-life cycles that emerge via unconventional
+ routes and that transition, in single steps, individuality to
+ higher levels. One such life cycle arises from conflicts among
+ levels of selection and invokes cheats as a primitive germ line: it
+ lays the foundation for collective reproduction, the basis of a
+ self-policing system, the selective environment for the emergence
+ of development, and hints at a plausible origin for a soma/germ
+ line distinction.} }
+
+
+@Article{Pigliucci10,
+ author = {Pigliucci, Massimo},
+ title = {Okasha's Evolution and the Levels of Selection:
+ Toward a Broader
+ Conception of Theoretical Biology},
+ journal = {Biol. Philos.},
+ year = 2010,
+ volume = 25,
+ pages = {405--415},
+ annote = {The debate about the levels of selection has been one
+ of the most controversial both in evolutionary biology and in
+ philosophy of science. Okasha's book makes the sort of
+ contribution that simply will not be able to be ignored by anyone
+ interested in this field for many years to come. However, my
+ interest here is in highlighting some examples of how Okasha goes
+ about discussing his material to suggest that his book is part of
+ an increasingly interesting trend that sees scientists and
+ philosophers coming together to build a broadened concept of
+ "theory" through a combination of standard mathematical treatments
+ and conceptual analyses. Given the often contentious history of the
+ relationship between philosophy and science, such trend cannot but
+ be welcome.}
+}
+
+@Article{Okasha09,
+ author = {Okasha, Samir},
+ title = {Individuals, Groups, Fitness and Utility:
+ Multi-Level Selection Meets Social Choice Theory},
+ journal = {Biol. Philos.},
+ year = 2009,
+ volume = 24,
+ pages = {561--584},
+ annote = {In models of multi-level selection, the property of
+ Darwinian fitness is attributed to entities at more than one level
+ of the biological hierarchy, e. g. individuals and groups. However,
+ the relation between individual and group fitness is a
+ controversial matter. Theorists disagree about whether group
+ fitness should always, or ever, be defined as total (or average)
+ individual fitness. This paper tries to shed light on the issue by
+ drawing on work in social choice theory, and pursuing an analogy
+ between fitness and utility. Social choice theorists have long been
+ interested in the relation between individual and social utility,
+ and have identified conditions under which social utility equals
+ total (or average) individual utility. These ideas are used to shed
+ light on the biological problem.}
+}
+
+@Article{Pigliucci09,
+ author = {Pigliucci, Massimo},
+ title = {{S}amir {O}kasha: {E}volution and the Levels of Selection},
+ journal = {Biol. Philos.},
+ year = 2009,
+ volume = 24,
+ pages = {551--560},
+ annote = {The debate about the levels of selection has been one
+ of the most controversial both in evolutionary biology and in
+ philosophy of science. Okasha's book makes the sort of
+ contribution that simply will not be able to be ignored by anyone
+ interested in this field for many years to come. However, my
+ interest here is in highlighting some examples of how Okasha goes
+ about discussing his material to suggest that his book is part of
+ an increasingly interesting trend that sees scientists and
+ philosophers coming together to build a broadened concept of
+ "theory" through a combination of standard mathematical treatments
+ and conceptual analyses. Given the often contentious history of the
+ relationship between philosophy and science, such trend cannot but
+ be welcome.}
+}
+
+@Article{Egas08,
+ author = {Egas, Martijn and Riedl, Arno},
+ title = {Proc. R. Soc. B.},
+ journal = {The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Maintenance
+ of Cooperation},
+ year = 2008,
+ volume = 275,
+ pages = {871--878},
+ annote = {Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation
+ among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in
+ biology and the social sciences. Recent findings suggest that
+ altruistic punishment is an important mechanism maintaining
+ cooperation among humans. We experimentally explore the boundaries
+ of altruistic punishment to maintain cooperation by varying both
+ the cost and the impact of punishment, using an exceptionally
+ extensive subject pool. Our results show that cooperation is only
+ maintained if conditions for altruistic punishment are relatively
+ favourable: low cost for the punisher and high impact on the
+ punished. Our results indicate that punishment is strongly governed
+ by its cost-to-impact ratio and that its effect on cooperation can
+ be pinned down to one single variable: the threshold level of
+ free-riding that goes unpunished. Additionally, actual pay-offs are
+ the lowest when altruistic punishment maintains cooperation,
+ because the pay-off destroyed through punishment exceeds the gains
+ from increased cooperation. Our results are consistent with the
+ interpretation that punishment decisions come from an amalgam of
+ emotional response and cognitive cost-impact analysis and suggest
+ that altruistic punishment alone can hardly maintain cooperation
+ under multi-level natural selection. Uncovering the workings of
+ altruistic punishment as has been done here is important because it
+ helps predicting under which conditions altruistic punishment is
+ expected to maintain cooperation.}
+}
+
+@Article{Helanterae06,
+ author = {Helanter{\"a}, H.},
+ title = {The Unity That Does Not Exist---A Review of
+ {A.} {B}urt \& {R.} {T}rivers 2006: {G}enes in {C}onflict},
+ journal = {J. Evol. Bol.},
+ year = 2006,
+ volume = 19,
+ pages = {2067--2070},
+ annote = {Organisms harbour several genetic elements with the
+ potential to act selfishly, and thus undermine the fitness of the
+ organism as a whole. In their book 'Genes in conflict', Austin Burt
+ and Robert Trivers thoroughly review evolution and molecular
+ biology of such selfish genetics elements, and set them in a kin
+ selection framework. In this review I set their views in a larger
+ multi-level selection framework, and consider potential problems in
+ the study of selfish genetics elements.}
+}
+
+@Article{Okasha05,
+ author = {Okasha, Samir},
+ title = {Altruism, Group Selection and Correlated Interaction},
+ journal = {Brit. J. Phil. Sci.},
+ year = 2005,
+ volume = 56,
+ pages = {703--725},
+ annote = {Group selection is one acknowledged mechanism for the
+ evolution of altruism. It is well known that for altruism to spread
+ by natural selection, interactions must be correlated; that is,
+ altruists must tend to associate with one another. But does group
+ selection itself require correlated interactions? Two possible
+ arguments for answering this question affirmatively are
+ explored. The first is a bad argument, for it rests on a
+ product/process confusion. The second is a more subtle argument,
+ whose validity (or otherwise) turns on issues concerning the
+ meaning of multi-level selection and how it should be modelled. A
+ cautious defence of the second argument is offered.
+ 1 Introduction
+ 2 Multi-level selection and the evolution of altruism
+ 3 Price's equation and multi-level selection
+ 4 Contextual analysis and multi-level selection
+ 5 The neighbour approach
+ 6 Recapitulation and conclusion.}
+}
+
+@Article{Okasha04,
+ author = {Okasha, Samir},
+ title = {Multi-Level Selection, Covariance and Contextual Analysis},
+ journal = {Brit. J. Phil. Sci.},
+ year = 2004,
+ volume = 55,
+ pages = {481--504},
+ annote = {Two alternative statistical approaches to modelling
+ multi-level selection in nature, both found in the contemporary
+ biological literature, are contrasted. The simple covariance
+ approach partitions the total selection differential on a
+ phenotypic character into within-group and between-group
+ components, and identifies the change due to group selection with
+ the latter. The contextual approach partitions the total selection
+ differential into different components, using multivariate
+ regression analysis. The two approaches have different implications
+ for the question of what constitutes group selection and what does
+ not. I argue that the contextual approach is theoretically
+ preferable. This has important implications for a number of issues
+ in the philosophical debate about the levels of selection.} }
+
+
+@Article{Bowles04,
+ author = {Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert},
+ title = {The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation
+ in Heterogeneous Populations},
+ journal = {Theor. Population Biol.},
+ year = 2004,
+ volume = 65,
+ pages = {17--28},
+ annote = {How do human groups maintain a high level of
+ cooperation despite a low level of genetic relatedness among group
+ members? We suggest that many humans have a predisposition to
+ punish those who violate group-beneficial norms, even when this
+ imposes a fitness cost on the punisher. Such altruistic punishment
+ is widely observed to sustain high levels of cooperation in
+ behavioral experiments and in natural settings. We offer a model
+ of cooperation and punishment that we call strong reciprocity:
+ where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social
+ norm, strong reciprocators obey the norm and punish its violators,
+ even though as a result they receive lower payoffs than other group
+ members, such as selfish agents who violate the norm and do not
+ punish, and pure cooperators who adhere to the norm but free-ride
+ by never punishing. Our agent-based simulations show that, under
+ assumptions approximating likely human environments over the
+ 100,000 years prior to the domestication of animals and plants, the
+ proliferation of strong reciprocators when initially rare is highly
+ likely, and that substantial frequencies of all three behavioral
+ types can be sustained in a population. As a result, high levels of
+ cooperation are sustained. Our results do not require that group
+ members be related or that group extinctions occur. (C) 2003
+ Published by Elsevier Inc.} }
+
+
+@Article{Gintis03,
+ author = {Gintis, Herbert},
+ title = {The Hitchhiker's Guide to Altruism: Gene-Culture
+ Coevolution, and the Internalization of Norms},
+ journal = {J. Theor. Biol.},
+ year = 2003,
+ volume = 220,
+ pages = {407--418},
+ annote = {An internal norm is a pattern of behavior enforced in
+ part by internal sanctions, such as shame, guilt and loss of
+ self-esteem, as opposed to purely external sanctions, such as
+ material rewards and punishment. The ability to internalize norms
+ is widespread among humans, although in some so-called
+ "sociopaths", this capacity is diminished or lacking. Suppose
+ there is one genetic locus that controls the capacity to
+ internalize norms. This model shows that if an internal norm is
+ fitness enhancing, then for plausible patterns of socialization,
+ the allele for internalization of norms is evolutionarily
+ stable. This framework can be used to model Herbert Simon's (1990)
+ explanation of altruism, showing that altruistic norms can
+ "hitchhike" on the general tendency of internal norms to be
+ personally fitness-enhancing. A multi-level selection, gene-culture
+ coevolution argument then explains why individually
+ fitness-reducing internal norms are likely to be prosocial as
+ opposed to socially harmful. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All
+ rights reserved.} }
+
+@Article{Kerr02,
+ author = {Kerr, Benjamin and Godfrey-Smith, Peter},
+ title = {Individualist and Multi-Level Perspectives on Selection
+ in Structured Populations},
+ journal = {Biol. Philos.},
+ year = 2002,
+ volume = 17,
+ pages = {477--517},
+ annote = {Recent years have seen a renewed debate over the
+ importance of group selection, especially as it relates to the
+ evolution of altruism. One feature of this debate has been
+ disagreement over which kinds of processes should be described in
+ terms of selection at multiple levels, within and between
+ groups. Adapting some earlier discussions, we present a
+ mathematical framework that can be used to explore the exact
+ relationships between evolutionary models that do, and those that
+ do not, explicitly recognize biological groups as fitness-bearing
+ entities. We show a fundamental set of mathematical equivalences
+ between these two kinds of models, one of which applies a form of
+ multi-level selection theory and the other being a form of
+ "individualism." However, we also argue that each type of model can
+ have heuristic advantages over the other. Indeed, it can be
+ positively useful to engage in a kind of back-and-forth switching
+ between two different perspectives on the evolutionary role of
+ groups. So the position we defend is a "gestalt-switching
+ pluralism".} }
+
+
+@Article{Kerr02a,
+ author = {Kerr, Benjamin and Godfrey-Smith, Peter},
+ title = {On {P}rice's Equation and Average Fitness},
+ journal = {Biol. Philos.},
+ year = 2002,
+ volume = 17,
+ pages = {551--565},
+ annote = {A number of recent discussions have argued that George
+ Price's equation for representing evolutionary change is a powerful
+ and illuminating tool, especially in the context of debates about
+ multiple levels of selection. Our paper dissects Price's equation
+ in detail, and compares it to another statistical tool: the
+ calculation and comparison of average fitnesses. The relations
+ between Price's equation and equations for evolutionary change
+ using average fitness are closer than is sometimes supposed. The
+ two approaches achieve a similar kind of statistical summary of one
+ generation of change, and they achieve this via a similar loss of
+ information about the underlying fitness structure.}
+}
+
+@Article{Nachtomy02,
+ author = {Nachtomy, Ohad and Shavit, Ayelet and Smith, Justin},
+ title = {Leibnizian Organisms, Nested Individuals, and
+ Units of Selection},
+ journal = {Theory Biosci.},
+ year = 2002,
+ volume = 121,
+ pages = {205--230},
+ annote = {Leibniz developed a new notion of individuality,
+ according to which individuals are nested one within another,
+ thereby abandoning the Aristotelian formula at the heart of
+ substantialist metaphysics, 'one body, one substance'. On this
+ model, the level of individuality is determined by the degree of
+ activity, and partly defined by its relations with other
+ individuals. In this article, we show the importance of this new
+ notion of individuality for some persisting questions in
+ theoretical biology. Many evolutionary theorists presuppose a model
+ of individuality that will eventually reduce to spatiotemporal
+ mechanisms, and some still look for an exclusive level or function
+ to determine a unit of selection. In recent years, a number of
+ alternatives to these exclusive approaches have emereged, and no
+ consensus can be foreseen. It is for this reason that we propose
+ the model of nested individuals. This model supports pluralistic
+ multi-level selection and rejects an exclusive level or function
+ for a unit of selection. Since activity is essential to the unity
+ of an individual, this model focuses on integrating processes of
+ interaction and replication instead of choosing between them. In
+ addition, the model of nested individuals may also be seen as a
+ distinct perspective among the various alternative models for the
+ unit of selection. This model stresses activity and pluralism: it
+ accepts simultaneuous co-existence of individuals at different
+ levels, nested one within the other. Our aim in this article is to
+ show now a chapter of the history of metaphysics may be fruitfully
+ brought to bear on the current debate over the unit of selection in
+ evolutionary biology.} }
+
+@Article{Canals98,
+ author = {Canals, Jos{\'e} and Vega-Redondo, Fernando},
+ title = {Multi-Level Evolution in Population Games},
+ journal = {Int. J. Game Theory},
+ year = 1998,
+ volume = 27,
+ pages = {21--35},
+ annote = {In this paper, we analyze a generalization of the
+ evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath, & Rob (1993) where the
+ population is partitioned into groups and evolution takes place "in
+ parallel" at the following two levels: (i) within groups, at the
+ lower level; among groups, at the higher one. Unlike in their
+ context, efficiency considerations always overcome those of
+ risk-dominance in the process of selecting the long-run
+ equilibrium. This provides an explicitly dynamic basis for a
+ conclusion reminiscent of those put forward in the biological
+ literature by the so-called theories group selection. From a
+ normative viewpoint, it suggests the potential importance of
+ "decentralization", here understood as local and independent
+ interaction.} }
+
+@Article{Simon10,
+ author = {Simon, Burton},
+ title = {A Dynamical Model of Two-Level Selection},
+ journal = {Evol. Ecol. Res.},
+ year = 2010,
+ volume = 12,
+ pages = {555--588},
+ annote = {Question: How do continuous-time evolutionary
+ trajectories of two-level
+ selection behave?
+ Approach: Construct and solve a dynamical model of two-level selection
+ capable of predicting evolutionary trajectories and equilibrium
+ configurations.
+ Mathematical methods: Evolutionary birth-death processes, simulation,
+ large population asymptotics, numerical solutions of hyperbolic PDEs.
+ Key assumptions: Environment composed of distinct groups of individuals.
+ Individuals' birth and death rates are differentiable functions of the
+ state of the environment. Groups' fissioning and extinction rates are
+ integrable functions of the state of the environment.
+ Main results: A continuous-time, discrete-state, stochastic model of
+ two-level selection that can be simulated exactly. A continuous-time,
+ continuous-state, deterministic (PDE) model of two-level selection that
+ can be solved numerically. A mathematical connection between the
+ stochastic and deterministic models. Equilibrium configurations of the
+ environment in models of the evolution of cooperation by two-level
+ selection often consist of complicated mixtures of groups of varying
+ sizes, ages, and levels of cooperation.}
+}
+
+@Article{Goodnight11,
+ author = {Goodnight, Charles J.},
+ title = {Evolution in Metacommunities},
+ journal = {Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B},
+ year = 2011,
+ volume = 366,
+ pages = {1401--1409},
+ annote = {A metacommunity can be defined as a set of communities
+ that are linked by migration, and extinction and recolonization. In
+ metacommunities, evolution can occur not only by processes that
+ occur within communities such as drift and individual selection,
+ but also by among-community processes, such as divergent selection
+ owing to random differences among communities in species
+ composition, and group and community-level selection. The effect of
+ these among-community-level processes depends on the pattern of
+ migration among communities. Migrating units may be individuals
+ (migrant pool model), groups of individuals (single-species
+ propagule pool model) or multi-species associations (multi-species
+ propagule pool model). The most interesting case is the
+ multi-species propagule pool model. Although this pattern of
+ migration may a priori seem rare, it becomes more plausible in
+ small well-defined 'communities' such as symbiotic associations
+ between two or a few species. Theoretical models and experimental
+ studies show that community selection is potentially an effective
+ evolutionary force. Such evolution can occur either through genetic
+ changes within species or through changes in the species
+ composition of the communities. Although laboratory studies show
+ that community selection can be important, little is known about
+ how important it is in natural populations.} }
+
+@Article{Nunney85a,
+ author = {Len Nunney},
+ title = {Group Selection, Altruism, and Structured-Deme Models},
+ journal = {American Naturalist},
+ year = 1985,
+ volume = 126,
+ pages = {212--230}
+}
+
+
+@Article{Nunney85b,
+ author = {Len Nunney},
+ title = {Female-Biased Sex Ratios: Individual or Group Selection?},
+ journal = {Evolution},
+ year = 1985,
+ volume = 39,
+ pages = {349--361}
+}
+
+@Article{Lion11,
+ author = {S{\'e}bastien Lion and Vincent A. A. Jansen and Troy Day},
+ title = {Evolution in Structured Populations:
+ Beyond the Kin Versus Group Debate},
+ journal = {Trends Ecol. Evol.},
+ year = 2011,
+ volume = 26,
+ pages = {193--201},
+ annote = {Much of the literature on social evolution is pervaded
+by the old debate about the relative merits of kin and group
+selection. In this debate, the biological interpretation of processes
+occurring in real populations is often conflated with the mathematical
+methodology used to describe these processes. Here, we highlight the
+distinction between the two by placing this discussion within the
+broader context of evolution in structured populations. In this review
+we show that the current debate overlooks important aspects of the
+interplay between genetic and demographic structuring, and argue that
+a continued focus on the relative merits of kin versus group selection
+distracts attention from moving the field forward.} }
+
+@Article{Leigh09,
+ author = {Leigh, E. G., Jr.},
+ title = {The Group Selection Controversy},
+ journal = {J. Evol. Biol.},
+ year = 2009,
+ volume = 23,
+ pages = {6--19},
+ annote = {Many thought Darwinian natural selection could not
+explain altruism. This error led Wynne-Edwards to explain sustainable
+exploitation in animals by selection against overexploiting
+groups. Williams riposted that selection among groups rarely overrides
+within-group selection. Hamilton showed that altruism can evolve
+through kin selection. How strongly does group selection influence
+evolution? Following Price, Hamilton showed how levels of selection
+interact: group selection prevails if Hamilton's rule applies. Several
+showed that group selection drove some major evolutionary
+transitions. Following Hamilton's lead, Queller extended Hamilton's
+rule, replacing genealogical relatedness by the regression on an
+actor's genotypic altruism of interacting neighbours' phenotypic
+altruism. Price's theorem shows the generality of Hamilton's rule. All
+instances of group selection can be viewed as increasing inclusive
+fitness of autosomal genomes. Nonetheless, to grasp fully how
+cooperation and altruism evolve, most biologists need more concrete
+concepts like kin selection, group selection and selection among
+individuals for their common good. } }
+
+@Article{Platt09,
+ author = {Thomas G. Platt and James D. Bever},
+ title = {Kin Competition and the Evolution
+ of Cooperation},
+ journal = {Trends Ecol. Evol.},
+ year = 2009,
+ volume = 24,
+ pages = {370--377},
+ annote = {Kin and multilevel selection theories predict that
+genetic structure is required for the evolution of
+cooperation. However, local competition among relatives can limit
+cooperative benefits, antagonizing the evolution of cooperation. We
+show that several ecological factors determine the extent to which kin
+competition constrains cooperative benefits. In addition, we argue
+that cooperative acts that expand local carrying capacity are less
+constrained by kin competition than other cooperative traits, and are
+therefore more likely to evolve. These arguments are particularly
+relevant to microbial cooperation, which often involves the production
+of public goods that promote population expansion. The challenge now
+is to understand how an organism's ecology influences how much
+cooperative groups contribute to future generations and thereby the
+evolution of cooperation.} }
+
+@Article{Rankin07,
+ author = {Daniel J. Rankin and Katja Bargum and Hanna Kokko},
+ title = {The Tragedy of the Commons in
+ Evolutionary Biology},
+ journal = {Trends Ecol. Evol.},
+ year = 2007,
+ volume = 22,
+ pages = {643--651},
+ annote = {Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons is an analogy
+that shows how individuals driven by self-interest can end up
+destroying the resource upon which they all depend. The proposed
+solutions for humans rely on highly advanced skills such as
+negotiation, which raises the question of how non-human organisms
+manage to resolve similar tragedies. In recent years, this question
+has promoted evolutionary biologists to apply the tragedy of the
+commons to a wide range of biological systems. Here, we provide tools
+to categorize different types of tragedy and review different
+mechanisms, including kinship, policing and diminishing returns that
+can resolve conflicts that could otherwise end in tragedy. A central
+open question, however, is how often biological systems are able to
+resolve these scenarios rather than drive themselves extinct through
+individual-level selection favouring self-interested behaviours.} }
+
+@Article{Taylor07:Dilemma,
+ author = {Christine Taylor and Martin A. Nowak},
+ title = {Transforming the Dilemma},
+ journal = {Evolution},
+ year = 2007,
+ volume = 61,
+ pages = {2281--2292},
+ annote = {How does natural selection lead to cooperation between
+competing individuals ? The Prisoner's Dilemma captures the essence of
+this problem. Two players can either cooperate or defect. The payoff
+for mutual cooperation, R, is greater than the payoff for mutual
+defection, P. But a defector versus a cooperator receives the highest
+payoff, T, where as the cooperator obtains the lowest payoff,
+S. Hence, the Prisoner's Dilemma is defined by the payoff ranking T >
+R > P > S. In a well-mixed population, defectors always have a higher
+expected payoff than cooperators, and therefore natural selection
+favors defectors. The evolution of cooperation requires specific
+mechanisms. Here we discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of
+cooperation: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection,
+group selection, and network reciprocity (or graph selection). Each
+mechanism leads to a transformation of the Prisoner's Dilemma payoff
+matrix. From the transformed matrices, we derive the fundamental
+conditions for the evolution of cooperation. The transformed matrices
+can be used in standard frameworks of evolutionary dynamics such as
+the replicator equation or stochastic processes of game dynamics in
+finite populations.} }
+
+@Article{West07,
+ author = {Stuart A. West and Stephen P. Diggle and Angus Buckling
+ and Andy Gardner and Ashleigh S. Griffin},
+ title = {The Social Lives of Microbes},
+ journal = {Ann. Rev. Evol. Ecol. Systematics},
+ year = 2007,
+ volume = 38,
+ pages = {53--77},
+ annote = {Our understanding of the social lives of microbes has been
+ revolutionized over the past 20 years. It used to be assumed that
+ bacteria and other microorganisms lived relatively independent
+ unicellular lives, without the cooperative behaviors that have
+ provoked so much interest in mammals, birds, and insects. However, a
+ rapidly expanding body of research has completely overturned this
+ idea, showing that microbes indulge in a variety of social behaviors
+ involving complex systems of cooperation, communication, and
+ synchronization. Work in this area has already provided some elegant
+ experimental tests of social evolutionary theory, demonstrating the
+ importance of factors such as relatedness, kin discrimination,
+ competition between relatives, and enforcement of cooperation. Our
+ aim here is to review these social behaviors, emphasizing the unique
+ opportunities they offer for testing existing evolutionary theory as
+ well as highlighting the novel theoretical problems that they pose.}
+}
+
+@Article{Lehmann06,
+ author = {L. Lehmann and L. Keller},
+ title = {The Evolution of Cooperation and Altruism---A
+ General Framework and a Classification of Models},
+ journal = {J. Evol. Biol.},
+ year = 2006,
+ volume = 19,
+ pages = {1365--1376},
+ annote = {One of the enduring puzzles in biology and the social
+sciences is the origin and persistence of intraspecific cooperation
+and altruism in humans and other species. Hundreds of theoretical
+models have been proposed and there is much confusion about the
+relationship between these models. To clarify the situation, we
+developed a synthetic conceptual framework that delineates the
+conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation. We
+show that at least one of the four following conditions needs to be
+fulfilled: direct benefits to the focal individual performing a
+cooperative act; direct or indirect information allowing a better than
+random guess about whether a given individual will behave
+cooperatively in repeated reciprocal interactions; preferential
+interactions between related individuals; and genetic correlation
+between genes coding for altruism and phenotypic traits that can be
+identified. When one or more of these conditions are met, altruism or
+cooperation can evolve if the cost-to-benefit ratio of altruistic and
+cooperative acts is greater than a threshold value. The
+cost-to-benefit ratio can be altered by coercion, punishment and
+policing which therefore act as mechanisms facilitating the evolution
+of altruism and cooperation. All the models proposed so far are
+explicitly or implicitly built on these general principles, allowing
+us to classify them into four general categories.} }
+
+@Article{Wilson83,
+ author = {David Sloan Wilson},
+ title = {The Group Selection Controversy: History and
+ Current Status},
+ journal = {Ann. Rev. Ecol. Systematics},
+ year = 1983,
+ volume = 14,
+ pages = {159--187}
+}
+
+@Article{West07a,
+ author = {S. A. West and A. S. Griffin and A. Gardner},
+ title = {Social Semantics: Altruism, Cooperation, Mutualism,
+ Strong Reciprocity and Group Selection},
+ journal = {J. Evol. Biol.},
+ year = 2007,
+ volume = 20,
+ pages = {415--432},
+ annote = {From an evolutionary perspective, social behaviours are
+those which have fitness consequences for both the individual that
+performs the behaviour, and another individual. Over the last 43
+years, a huge theoretical and empirical literature has developed on
+this topic. However, progress is often hindered by poor communication
+between scientists, with different people using the same term to mean
+different things, or different terms to mean the same thing. This can
+obscure what is biologically important, and what is not. The potential
+for such semantic confusion is greatest with interdisciplinary
+research. Our aim here is to address issues of semantic confusion that
+have arisen with research on the problem of cooperation. In
+particular, we: (i) discuss confusion over the terms kin selection,
+mutualism, mutual benefit, cooperation, altruism, reciprocal altruism,
+weak altruism, altruistic punishment, strong reciprocity, group
+selection and direct fitness; (ii) emphasize the need to distinguish
+between proximate (mechanism) and ultimate (survival value)
+explanations of behaviours. We draw examples from all areas, but
+especially recent work on humans and microbes. } }
+
+@Article{Wilson08,
+ author = {D. S. Wilson},
+ title = {Social Semantics: Toward a Genuine Pluralism in the
+ Study of Social Behaviour},
+ journal = {J. Evol. Biol.},
+ year = 2008,
+ volume = 21,
+ pages = {368--373},
+ annote = {Pluralism is the coexistence of equivalent theoretical
+frameworks, either because they are historically entrenched or because
+they achieve separate insights by viewing the same process in
+different ways. A recent article by West et al. [Journal of
+Evolutionary Biology (2007) vol. 20, 415-432] attempts to classify the
+many equivalent frameworks that have been developed to study the
+evolution of social behaviour. This article addresses shortcomings in
+the West et al.'s article, especially with respect to multilevel
+selection, in a common effort to maximize the benefits of pluralism
+while minimizing the semantic costs.} }
+
+@Article{West08,
+ author = {S. A. West and A. S. Griffin and A. Gardner},
+ title = {Social Semantics: How Useful Has Group Selection Been?},
+ journal = {J. Evol. Biol.},
+ year = 2008,
+ volume = 21,
+ pages = {374--385},
+ annote = {In our social semantics review ( J. Evol. Biol., 2007,
+415-432), we discussed some of the misconceptions and sources of
+confusion associated with group selection. Wilson (2007, this issue)
+claims that we made three errors regarding group selection. Here, we
+aim to expand upon the relevant points from our review in order to
+refute this claim. The last 45 years of research provide clear
+evidence of the relative use of the kin and group selection
+approaches. Kin selection methodologies are more tractable, allowing
+the construction of models that can be applied more easily to specific
+biological examples, including those chosen by Wilson to illustrate
+the utility of the group selection approach. In contrast, the group
+selection approach is not only less useful, but also appears to
+frequently have negative consequences by fostering confusion that
+leads to wasted effort. More generally, kin selection theory allows
+the construction of a unified conceptual overview that can be applied
+across all taxa, whereas there is no formal theory of group
+selection.} }
+
+@Article{Hamilton64a,
+ author = {Hamilton, W. D.},
+ title = {The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. {I}},
+ journal = {J. Theor. Biol.},
+ year = 1964,
+ volume = 7,
+ pages = {1--16}
+}
+
+@Article{Hamilton64b,
+ author = {Hamilton, W. D.},
+ title = {The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. {II}},
+ journal = {J. Theor. Biol.},
+ year = 1964,
+ volume = 7,
+ pages = {17--52}
+}
+
+
+@Article{Lion09,
+ author = {S. Lion and S. Gandon},
+ title = {Habitat Saturation and the Spatial Evolutionary Ecology
+ of Altruism},
+ journal = {J. Evol. Biol.},
+ year = 2009,
+ volume = 22,
+ pages = {1487--1502},
+ annote = {Under which ecological conditions should individuals
+help their neighbours? We investigate the effect of habitat saturation
+on the evolution of helping behaviours in a spatially structured
+population. We combine the formalisms of population genetics and
+spatial moment equations to tease out the effects of various
+physiological (direct benefits and costs of helping) and ecological
+parameters (such as the density of empty sites) on the selection
+gradient on helping. Our analysis highlights the crucial importance of
+demography for the evolution of helping behaviours. It shows that
+habitat saturation can have contrasting effects, depending on the form
+of competition (direct vs. indirect competition) and on the
+conditionality of helping. In our attempt to bridge the gap between
+spatial ecology and population genetics, we derive an expression for
+relatedness that takes into account both habitat saturation and the
+spatial structure of genetic variation. This analysis helps clarify
+discrepancies in the results obtained by previous theoretical
+studies. It also provides a theoretical framework taking into account
+the interplay between demography and kin selection, in which new
+biological questions can be explored.} }
+
+@Article{Wilson77,
+ author = {David Sloan Wilson},
+ title = {Structured Demes and the Evolution of
+ Group-Advantageous Traits},
+ journal = {American Naturalist},
+ year = 1977,
+ volume = 111,
+ pages = {157--185},
+ annote = {1. Most organisms interact with a set of neighbors
+smaller than the deme (its trait group). Demes therefore are not only
+a population of individuals but also a population of groups
+(structured demes). 2. Trait groups vary in their composition. The
+minimum variance to be expected is that arising from a binomial
+distribution. Most populations have a higher variance than this due to
+(a) differential interactions with the environment and (b) the effects
+of reproduction inside the trait groups. 3. As a consequence of this
+variation, an individual on the average experiences its own "type" in
+a greater frequency than actually exists in the deme. Its behaviors
+are therefore directed differentially toward fellow types, and this is
+the fundamental requirement for the evolution of altruism. 4. Models
+are presented for warning cries and other donor-recipient relations,
+resource notification, the evolution of prudence in exploitation and
+interference competition, and the effect of differential trait-group
+extinction. In all cases evolution in structured demes differs from
+traditional individual-selection models. Individual selection
+corresponds to the case where there is zero variance among trait
+groups, that is, complete homogeneity. 5. The "threshold" variance
+permitting the evolution of altruism (negative fitness change to the
+donor) is that arising from a binomial distribution. As this is the
+minimum to be expected in nature, this theory predicts that at least
+weakly altruistic behavior should be a common occurrence (but see
+[9]). 6. If a population is overexploiting its resource, a decrease in
+feeding rate through interference may be selected for given any
+trait-group variation. 7. When trait groups are composed entirely of
+siblings (i.e., kin groups), the model is mathematically equivalent to
+kin selection. 8. As well as increasing population fitness, social
+systems may also evolve an "immunity" against group-detrimental
+types. 9. If a given group-advantageous effect can be accomplished
+through both altruistic and selfish mechanisms, the selfish mechanism
+will be selected. A paucity of altruistic behaviors may signify that
+it is usually possible to create the same result selfishly--not that
+altruism "cannot" be selected for} }
+
+@Article{Fletcher09,
+ author = {Jeffrey A. Fletcher and Michael Doebeli},
+ title = {A Simple and General Explanation for the
+ Evolution of Altruism},
+ journal = {Proc. Roy. Soc. B},
+ year = 2009,
+ volume = 276,
+ pages = {13--19},
+ annote = {We present a simple framework that highlights the most
+fundamental requirement for the evolution of altruism: assortment
+between individuals carrying the cooperative genotype and the helping
+behaviours of others with which these individuals interact. We
+partition the fitness effects on individuals into those due to self
+and those due to the \u2018interaction environment\u2019, and show
+that it is the latter that is most fundamental to understanding the
+evolution of altruism. We illustrate that while kinship or genetic
+similarity among those interacting may generate a favourable structure
+of interaction environments, it is not a fundamental requirement for
+the evolution of altruism, and even suicidal aid can theoretically
+evolve without help ever being exchanged among genetically similar
+individuals. Using our simple framework, we also clarify a common
+confusion made in the literature between alternative fitness
+accounting methods (which may equally apply to the same biological
+circumstances) and unique causal mechanisms for creating the
+assortment necessary for altruism to be favoured by natural
+selection.} }
+
+@Article{Lion09a,
+ author = {S{\'e}bastien Lion},
+ title = {Relatedness in Spatially Structured Populations
+ with Empty Sites: An Approach Based on Spatial Moment
+ Equations},
+ journal = {J. Theor. Biol.},
+ year = 2009,
+ volume = 260,
+ pages = {121--131},
+ annote = {Taking into account the interplay between spatial
+ecological dynamics and selection is a major challenge in evolutionary
+ecology. Although inclusive fitness theory has proven to be a very
+useful tool to unravel the interactions between spatial genetic
+structuring and selection, applications of the theory usually rely on
+simplifying demographic assumptions. In this paper, I attempt to
+bridge the gap between spatial demographic models and kin selection
+models by providing a method to compute approximations for relatedness
+coefficients in a spatial model with empty sites. Using spatial moment
+equations, I provide an approximation of nearest-neighbour relatedness
+on random regular networks, and show that this approximation performs
+much better than the ordinary pair approximation. I discuss the
+connection between the relatedness coefficients I define and those
+used in population genetics, and sketch some potential extensions of
+the theory.} }
+
+@article{Hirose22072011,
+author = {Hirose, Shigenori and Benabentos, Rocio and Ho, Hsing-I and Kuspa, Adam and Shaulsky, Gad},
+title = {Self-Recognition in Social Amoebae Is Mediated by Allelic Pairs of Tiger Genes},
+volume = 333,
+number = 6041,
+pages = {467-470},
+year = 2011,
+journal = {Science},
+doi = {10.1126/science.1203903},
+abstract ={Free-living cells of the social amoebae Dictyostelium
+discoideum can aggregate and develop into multicellular fruiting
+bodies in which many die altruistically as they become stalk cells
+that support the surviving spores. Dictyostelium cells exhibit kin
+discrimination—a potential defense against cheaters, which
+sporulate without contributing to the stalk. Kin discrimination
+depends on strain relatedness, and the polymorphic genes tgrB1 and
+tgrC1 are potential components of that mechanism. Here, we demonstrate
+a direct role for these genes in kin discrimination. We show that a
+matching pair of tgrB1 and tgrC1 alleles is necessary and sufficient
+for attractive self-recognition, which is mediated by differential
+cell-cell adhesion. We propose that TgrB1 and TgrC1 proteins mediate
+this adhesion through direct binding. This system is a genetically
+tractable ancient model of eukaryotic self-recognition.},
+}
+
+@Article{Leadbeater11,
+ author = {Ellouise Leadbeater b*mand Jonathan M. Carruthers
+ and Jonathan P. Green and Neil S. Rosser
+ and Jeremy Field},
+ title = {Nest Inheritance Is the Missing Source of Direct
+ Fitness in a Primitively Eusocial Insect},
+ journal = {Science},
+ year = 2011,
+ volume = 333,
+ number = 6044,
+ pages = {874--876},
+ abstract= {Animals that cooperate with nonrelatives represent a
+challenge to inclusive fitness theory, unless cooperative behavior is
+shown to provide direct fitness benefits. Inheritance of breeding
+resources could provide such benefits, but this route to cooperation
+has been little investigated in the social insects. We show that nest
+inheritance can explain the presence of unrelated helpers in a classic
+social insect model, the primitively eusocial wasp Polistes
+dominulus. We found that subordinate helpers produced more direct
+offspring than lone breeders, some while still subordinate but most
+after inheriting the dominant position. Thus, while indirect fitness
+obtained through helping relatives has been the dominant paradigm for
+understanding eusociality in insects, direct fitness is vital to
+explain cooperation in P. dominulus.} }
+
+@Article{Kiers11,
+ author = {E. Toby Kiers and Marie Duhamel and Yugandhar Beesetty
+ and Jerry A. Mensah and Oscar Franken and Erik Verbruggen
+ and Carl R. Fellbaum and George A. Kowalchuk
+ and Miranda M. Hart and Alberto Bago and Todd M. Palmer
+ and Stuart A. West and Philippe Vandenkoornhuyse
+ and Jan Jansa and Heike B\"ucking},
+ title = {Reciprocal Rewards Stabilize Cooperation in the
+ Mycorrhizal Symbiosis},
+ journal = {Science},
+ year = 2011,
+ volume = 333,
+ number = 6044,
+ pages = {880--882},
+ annote = {Plants and their arbuscular mycorrhizal fungal
+symbionts interact in complex underground networks involving multiple
+partners. This increases the potential for exploitation and defection
+by individuals, raising the question of how partners maintain a fair,
+two-way transfer of resources. We manipulated cooperation in plants
+and fungal partners to show that plants can detect, discriminate, and
+reward the best fungal partners with more carbohydrates. In turn,
+their fungal partners enforce cooperation by increasing nutrient
+transfer only to those roots providing more carbohydrates. On the
+basis of these observations we conclude that, unlike many other
+mutualisms, the symbiont cannot be \u201censlaved.\u201d Rather, the
+mutualism is evolutionarily stable because control is bidirectional,
+and partners offering the best rate of exchange are rewarded.} }
+
+@Article{Johnson11:Overconfidence,
+ author = {Johnson, Dominic D.P. and Fowler, James H.},
+ title = {The evolution of Overconfidence},
+ journal = {Nature},
+ year = 2011,
+ volume = 477,
+ number = 7364,
+ pages = {317--320},
+ annote = {Confidence is an essential ingredient of success in a
+wide range of domains ranging from job performance and mental health
+to sports, business and combat1, 2, 3, 4. Some authors have suggested
+that not just confidence but overconfidence\u2014believing you are
+better than you are in reality\u2014is advantageous because it serves
+to increase ambition, morale, resolve, persistence or the credibility
+of bluffing, generating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which
+exaggerated confidence actually increases the probability of success3,
+4, 5, 6, 7, 8. However, overconfidence also leads to faulty
+assessments, unrealistic expectations and hazardous decisions, so it
+remains a puzzle how such a false belief could evolve or remain stable
+in a population of competing strategies that include accurate,
+unbiased beliefs. Here we present an evolutionary model showing that,
+counterintuitively, overconfidence maximizes individual fitness and
+populations tend to become overconfident, as long as benefits from
+contested resources are sufficiently large compared with the cost of
+competition. In contrast, unbiased strategies are only stable under
+limited conditions. The fact that overconfident populations are
+evolutionarily stable in a wide range of environments may help to
+explain why overconfidence remains prevalent today, even if it
+contributes to hubris, market bubbles, financial collapses, policy
+failures, disasters and costly wars9, 10, 11, 12, 13.} }
+
diff --git a/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/afpsample.pdf b/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/afpsample.pdf
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diff --git a/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/afpsample.tex b/Master/texmf-dist/doc/latex/afparticle/afpsample.tex
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@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+\documentclass[1p]{afparticle}
+\usepackage{lipsum}
+\begin{document}
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+% Information about the current issue
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+% Volume
+\volumenumber{2}
+% Issue
+\issuenumber{1}
+% Year
+\publicationyear{2014}
+% Number of the paper in the journal
+\papernumber{2}
+% First page
+\startpage{256}
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+% Information about the paper
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+% Title. If necessary, put the short title in the [..]
+\title[Research Title]{Unnecessarily Complicated Research Title}
+% Authors. The star denotes thecorressponding author
+\author*{John Smith}
+\address{Department, University, City, State, Country, Phone, E-mail}
+\author{Tom F. Johnson}
+\address{Department, University, City, State, Country}
+\author{Peter Sellers}
+\address{Department, University, City, State, Country}
+\author{Jay P. Singh}
+\address{Department, University, City, State, Country}
+% If necessary, redefine \shortauthors
+\renewcommand\shortauthors{John Smith et al}
+% Abstract
+\begin{abstract}
+ \lipsum[1]
+\end{abstract}
+% Keywords
+\begin{keyword}
+ One\sep Two\sep Three
+\end{keyword}
+
+% Technical information
+% Reception
+\received{April 1, 2013}
+% Revision; can be repeated
+\revised{May 20, 2013}
+\revised{June 15, 2013}
+% Acceptance
+\accepted{July 30, 2013}
+
+% Making title
+\maketitle
+
+\section{First section}
+\lipsum[2]
+
+% In-text citation
+As shown by \citet{Haidt07}, people are selfish, but morally
+motivated. See also the work by
+\citet{Stapel08042011}.
+
+% Parenthetical citations
+The method in \citep{Zintzaras10} may help.
+
+\subsection{A subsection}
+
+\lipsum[4]
+
+\subsubsection{A subsubsection}
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%
+% TABLE
+%
+% Put caption before the table. Use booktabs for table
+% formatting
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+\begin{table}
+ \centering
+ \caption{A sample table}
+ \label{tab:sample}
+ \begin{tabular}{lrrr}
+ \toprule
+ Item & Units & Cost per unit, \$ & Total cost, \$\\
+ \midrule
+ Stuffed Gnus & 5 & 12.50 & 62.50 \\
+ Memory Sticks & 4 & 6.00 & 24.00\\
+ \midrule
+ Total & & & 86.50\\
+ \bottomrule
+ \end{tabular}
+\end{table}
+
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%
+% FIGURE
+%
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+\begin{figure}
+ \centering
+ \includegraphics{vitruvian}
+ \caption{A sample figure}
+ \label{fig:sample}
+\end{figure}
+
+\lipsum[7-21]
+
+
+% Bibliography
+\bibliography{afpsample}
+\bibliographystyle{apacite}
+
+% This should be the last command
+\printbackmatter
+
+\end{document}
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