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authorKarl Berry <karl@freefriends.org>2016-02-15 19:00:21 +0000
committerKarl Berry <karl@freefriends.org>2016-02-15 19:00:21 +0000
commitac696bf78edd670ee0edf00a710abb41e9c3dcb3 (patch)
tree2a5879d1cf521de7a137ac8afcb223934d74118c /Build/source/texk/kpathsea
parent6ace9ac1f4a8a247c6667895caa9a184653a5778 (diff)
small doc updates
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk@39724 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
Diffstat (limited to 'Build/source/texk/kpathsea')
-rw-r--r--Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf21
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf b/Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf
index 67db7457d6f..33cc0b7c229 100644
--- a/Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf
+++ b/Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf
@@ -554,10 +554,10 @@ shell_escape = p
%
% The programs listed here are as safe as any we know: they either do
% not write any output files, respect openout_any, or have hard-coded
-% restrictions similar or higher to openout_any=p. They also have no
-% features to invoke arbitrary other programs, and no known exploitable
-% bugs. All to the best of our knowledge. They also have practical use
-% for being called from TeX.
+% restrictions similar to or higher than openout_any=p. They also have
+% no features to invoke arbitrary other programs, and no known
+% exploitable bugs. All to the best of our knowledge. They also have
+% practical use for being called from TeX.
%
shell_escape_commands = \
bibtex,bibtex8,\
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ repstopdf,\
% ulqda - but requires optional SHA1.pm, so why bother.
% tex, latex, etc. - need to forbid --shell-escape, and inherit openout_any.
-% plain TeX should remain unenhanced.
+% plain "tex" should remain unenhanced.
shell_escape.tex = f
shell_escape.initex = f
@@ -591,14 +591,15 @@ shell_escape.initex = f
TEXMF_RESTRICTED_SCRIPTS = \
{!!$TEXMFLOCAL,!!$TEXMFDIST}/scripts/{$progname,$engine,}//
-% Allow TeX \openin, \openout, or \input on filenames starting with `.'
-% (e.g., .rhosts) or outside the current tree (e.g., /etc/passwd)?
+% Do we allow TeX \input or \openin (openin_any), or \openout
+% (openout_any) on filenames starting with `.' (e.g., .rhosts) or
+% outside the current tree (e.g., /etc/passwd)?
% a (any) : any file can be opened.
-% r (restricted) : disallow opening "dotfiles".
+% r (restricted) : disallow opening dot files
% p (paranoid) : as `r' and disallow going to parent directories, and
% restrict absolute paths to be under $TEXMFOUTPUT.
-openout_any = p
openin_any = a
+openout_any = p
% Write .log/.dvi/etc. files here, if the current directory is unwritable.
%TEXMFOUTPUT = /tmp
@@ -614,7 +615,7 @@ MISSFONT_LOG = missfont.log
% To suppress nothing, use TEX_HUSH = none or do not set the variable at all.
TEX_HUSH = none
-% Allow TeX, and MF to parse the first line of an input file for
+% Allow TeX and MF to parse the first line of an input file for
% the %&format construct.
parse_first_line = t