diff options
author | Karl Berry <karl@freefriends.org> | 2016-02-15 19:00:21 +0000 |
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committer | Karl Berry <karl@freefriends.org> | 2016-02-15 19:00:21 +0000 |
commit | ac696bf78edd670ee0edf00a710abb41e9c3dcb3 (patch) | |
tree | 2a5879d1cf521de7a137ac8afcb223934d74118c /Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf | |
parent | 6ace9ac1f4a8a247c6667895caa9a184653a5778 (diff) |
small doc updates
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk@39724 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
Diffstat (limited to 'Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf')
-rw-r--r-- | Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf | 21 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf b/Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf index 67db7457d6f..33cc0b7c229 100644 --- a/Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf +++ b/Build/source/texk/kpathsea/texmf.cnf @@ -554,10 +554,10 @@ shell_escape = p % % The programs listed here are as safe as any we know: they either do % not write any output files, respect openout_any, or have hard-coded -% restrictions similar or higher to openout_any=p. They also have no -% features to invoke arbitrary other programs, and no known exploitable -% bugs. All to the best of our knowledge. They also have practical use -% for being called from TeX. +% restrictions similar to or higher than openout_any=p. They also have +% no features to invoke arbitrary other programs, and no known +% exploitable bugs. All to the best of our knowledge. They also have +% practical use for being called from TeX. % shell_escape_commands = \ bibtex,bibtex8,\ @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ repstopdf,\ % ulqda - but requires optional SHA1.pm, so why bother. % tex, latex, etc. - need to forbid --shell-escape, and inherit openout_any. -% plain TeX should remain unenhanced. +% plain "tex" should remain unenhanced. shell_escape.tex = f shell_escape.initex = f @@ -591,14 +591,15 @@ shell_escape.initex = f TEXMF_RESTRICTED_SCRIPTS = \ {!!$TEXMFLOCAL,!!$TEXMFDIST}/scripts/{$progname,$engine,}// -% Allow TeX \openin, \openout, or \input on filenames starting with `.' -% (e.g., .rhosts) or outside the current tree (e.g., /etc/passwd)? +% Do we allow TeX \input or \openin (openin_any), or \openout +% (openout_any) on filenames starting with `.' (e.g., .rhosts) or +% outside the current tree (e.g., /etc/passwd)? % a (any) : any file can be opened. -% r (restricted) : disallow opening "dotfiles". +% r (restricted) : disallow opening dot files % p (paranoid) : as `r' and disallow going to parent directories, and % restrict absolute paths to be under $TEXMFOUTPUT. -openout_any = p openin_any = a +openout_any = p % Write .log/.dvi/etc. files here, if the current directory is unwritable. %TEXMFOUTPUT = /tmp @@ -614,7 +615,7 @@ MISSFONT_LOG = missfont.log % To suppress nothing, use TEX_HUSH = none or do not set the variable at all. TEX_HUSH = none -% Allow TeX, and MF to parse the first line of an input file for +% Allow TeX and MF to parse the first line of an input file for % the %&format construct. parse_first_line = t |