diff options
-rw-r--r-- | Master/tlpkg/doc/tl-security-proposal.txt | 149 |
1 files changed, 111 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/Master/tlpkg/doc/tl-security-proposal.txt b/Master/tlpkg/doc/tl-security-proposal.txt index 7da5a52dd3a..9c972eb711b 100644 --- a/Master/tlpkg/doc/tl-security-proposal.txt +++ b/Master/tlpkg/doc/tl-security-proposal.txt @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ Security Proposal for TeX Live ============================== -(last change NP 2016-03-07) +(last change NP 2016-03-19) Changelog: +* 20160319 + key management, rewrite * 20160307 use md5 for location digest - saved tlpdb filename switch to sha512 @@ -10,50 +12,121 @@ Changelog: initial document -We use md5 sums in the following places: -1) md5sum of the texlive.tlpdb in texlive.tlpdb.md5 in tlnet/tlcritical - and all the normal dists -2) md5 sum of *location* string of remote end - - if the database is present (tlpkg/texlive.tlpdb.MD5SUM) and the - md5sum downloaded from 1) and the saved md5sum agree, do not - redownload the remote tlpdb but use local copy -3) md5sum of containers (.tar.xz) - are checked now only during installation, after my commit also - from tlmgr +Aim is to give higher security and verification level to downloaded +and installed packages of TeX Live. There are two possible attacks +we want to detect: -It would make sense to replace some or all of the above with sha256. -2) is the only one we could keep as md5, but I propose that if -we switch, then we switch all the md5 to sha512. +Attack scenaria +=============== +breach of ctan mirror + can be detected via gpg signature +breach of tug.org + revoke subkey + inform CTAN to tear down all mirrors + maybe have tlmgr action update-pubkey for receiving new subkey? + prepare new repo with new signing subkey - Change 20160307 - I made changes that 2) remains as MD5 (tl_short_digest) - so that the generated filenames are not exorbitant long - (like for sha512). -In principle my idea about security setup is as follows: +TODO +* location of the gpg keys + texlive.infra or new package texlive.keys + texlive.keys should be treated with special priority and updated + before anything else (?) + +Definitions: +* checksum: defined via tl_checksum, currently is sha512 +* short checksum: defined via tl_short_digest, currently md5 + + +Verification Level 1: tlpdb +=========================== +When a tlpdb is downloaded from the remote server there are two +steps of verification: +* download tlpdb +* download tlpdb.checksum +* if gpg is available + - download tlpdb.checksum.gpg + . if not available, continue without error! + - verify gpg signature + . if success, continue + . if failure, error out +* verify tlpdb checksum + +Verification Level 2: containers +================================ +The tlpdb ships size and checksum information of each container. +These are verified after download. + + +Verification of the installer +============================= For the installer * installer packages are sha512 hashed (already done!) * the sha512 files are gpg signed with our gpg tlnet key * our public gpg key is included in texlive.infra package + (or in a separate texlive.keys package!) + + +Other usage +=========== +short checksum of *location* string of remote end +if the database is present (tlpkg/texlive.tlpdb.MD5SUM) and the +md5sum downloaded from 1) and the saved md5sum agree, do not +redownload the remote tlpdb but use local copy + + +Key management +============== +One master key TeX Live <tex-live@tug.org> which is kept +offline at kb and np + +On signing sub key which is kept on tug.org for automatic signing of tlpdb. + + +Key generation howto +==================== + +BASE=.../ +MAIN=$BASE/main +SUB=$BASE/sub +PUBONLY=$BASE/pub + +create gpg key +-------------- +(To be done only once or when key is compromised!) + gpg --homedir $MAIN --no-use-agent genkey + .... + + gives keyid KEYID (now 0x06BAB6BC) + + this key expires after 18 month, needs to be extended each year! + +create signing sub key +---------------------- +(needs to be done when we feel like it, not necessary for each year) + + gpg --homedir $MAIN --no-use-agent --expert --edit-key $KEYID + gpg> addkey + ... + choose 4 (RSA (sign only)), expires 18m + +create subkey only dir for tug.org +---------------------------------- +with gpg <= 2.0 we need to export secret subkeys, remove secret subkey +(that removes all), and import only subkeys back in + rm -rf $SUB + cp -a $MAIN $SUB + gpg --homedir $SUB --no-use-agent --output secret-subkeys --export-secret-subkeys $KEYID + gpg --homedir $SUB --no-use-agent --delete-secret-key $KEYID + gpg --homedir $SUB --no-use-agent --import secret-subkeys + + +create pubkey only dir for inclusion in texlive repo +---------------------------------------------------- + rm -rf $PUBONLY + cp -a $SUB $PUBONLY + gpg --homedir $PUBONLY --no-use-agent --delete-secret-key $KEYID + rm $PUBONLY/*~ -For the rest (installation or update from remote) -* install-tl/tlmgr downloads the texlive.checksum.gpg and - texlive.checksum -* verifies that this is ok -* if yes, download the texlive.tlpdb and check the checksum - value of it (this is the reason we should switch from - md5 to sha512, as md5 is AFAIR fakeable) -* if all succeed, do the usual verification of each - container only by sha512 (instead of md5) - -There is no need to sign each container, as we are having -indirectly signed sha512 hashes of the containers -(in the tlpdb, which is sha512-ed, and then signed). - -Usage: -* if gpg is found, try to use it, otherwise just - give warning about how to verify/gpg necessary -* only if gpg is available, download .sha512.asc and - verify |