diff options
| author | Joachim Schrod <jschrod@acm.org> | 2007-07-03 16:16:05 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Joachim Schrod <jschrod@acm.org> | 2007-07-03 16:16:05 +0000 |
| commit | 9347ce7eda861fbc572acfaec36e4bcfc76e053e (patch) | |
| tree | 508586fb240200306f0734dccba52b44d61abc3d /Build/source/texk/dviljk | |
| parent | 9de7990265f589fc24482e88c46526ebfdf7bc0e (diff) | |
Implement TEX_HUSH option `readable'.
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk@4537 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
Diffstat (limited to 'Build/source/texk/dviljk')
| -rw-r--r-- | Build/source/texk/dviljk/ChangeLog | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Build/source/texk/dviljk/dvi2xx.c | 12 |
2 files changed, 12 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Build/source/texk/dviljk/ChangeLog b/Build/source/texk/dviljk/ChangeLog index 218b9ff2a97..eb769644cfb 100644 --- a/Build/source/texk/dviljk/ChangeLog +++ b/Build/source/texk/dviljk/ChangeLog @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ (DoSpecial): Search for include files with kpathsea, both via DVILJINPUTS and TEXINPUTS. + (CopyFile, CopyHPFile): Implement TEX_HUSH option `readable.' + 2007-07-02 Joachim Schrod <jschrod@acm.org> * dvi2xx.c (DoSpecial): Security issue: usage of tmpnam() caused diff --git a/Build/source/texk/dviljk/dvi2xx.c b/Build/source/texk/dviljk/dvi2xx.c index 35581c4a442..071dbfc5788 100644 --- a/Build/source/texk/dviljk/dvi2xx.c +++ b/Build/source/texk/dviljk/dvi2xx.c @@ -746,7 +746,10 @@ char *str; int todo; if ( (spfp = BINOPEN(str)) == FPNULL ) { - Warning("Unable to open file %s", str ); + if ( errno != EACCES || ! kpse_tex_hush("readable") ) { + Warning("Unable to open file %s (errno=%d), skipping inclusion", + str, errno); + } return; } qfprintf(ERR_STREAM," [%s", str); @@ -827,7 +830,10 @@ char *str; int count,miny,minx,num; if ( (spfp = BINOPEN(str)) == FPNULL ) { - Warning("Unable to open file %s", str); + if ( errno != EACCES || ! kpse_tex_hush("readable") ) { + Warning("Unable to open file %s (errno=%d), skipping inclusion", + str, errno); + } return; } minx = 32767; /* Set to a high value initially */ @@ -4162,6 +4168,8 @@ int n; Warning ("TMPDIR %s is too long, using /tmp instead", base_dir); base_dir = "/tmp"; } + /* FIXME: Actually, we would need a function to sanitize base_dir here. + There may still be constructs like /.. or similar. [03 Jul 07 -js] */ if ( base_dir[0] == '/' && base_dir[1] == '\0' ) { Warning ("Feeling naughty, do we? / is no temporary directory, dude"); base_dir = "/tmp"; |